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EQUITABLE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL OR
IINDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

By WmLTAm Q. DE FuNm K*
Equity, as is well known, developed as a system of jurisprudence to supply the deficiendies in the remedial relief available at common law and in the common law courts. The common law might give a right but -with the powers of the common
law courts not sufficient to give a complete remedy, or the
common law gave no right but upon principles of universal
justice the interference of some judicial power was necessary to
prevent a wrong. Thus, one prerequisite of equitable relief
came to be that there was no remedy at law or ele only an incomplete or inadequate remedy
Unfortunately, when equity was developing and emerging
as a full-fledged system of jurisprudence, rights of property
rather than human rights were paramount. The personal, the
individual, the civil, the social, the political rights of the common man were in that day vague and more or less formless.
Consequently, equity, in supplying the deficiencies or lack of
remedies in the common law courts, found itself solely engaged
with matters of property and rights incidental thereto. From
this arose the second prerequisite of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, that property or property rights must be in question.
While the concept of what are property and property
rights has necessarily been broadened by the great economic,
industrial and mercantile growth of Anglo-American life and
duly recognized by courts in the exercise of equity jurisdiction,
courts of equity continue to be burdened, like Coleridge's ancient mariner, with a dead albatross hung around their necks.
LL.B., Umversity of Virginia; LL.M., University of San Francisco; Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. Author, PRiNCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMUNITY PROPERTY.
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That is, to repeat the rule, courts of equity intervene only to
protect property and property rights and not to prevent injuries of a purely personal or individual nature which have no
connection or association with property interests. The rule
continues to be reiterated by numerous writers and courts at
the present day I Although frequently asserted by courts at
the very moment they are seeking to evade its stultifying effect, its constant assertion apparently demands that the lawyer
and the law student accept it as established. Then it is necessary to begin the study of the ways and situations in winch, it
2
is frequently evaded.
That this restriction on the exercise of equity jurisdiction
should be removed would seem to be obvious. Equity developed
to relieve the inadequacies of remedies available at common law.
That this was m instances of property rights or property interests was due to the fact that the society of that day gave weight
principally only to such. rights. But the very development of
our way of life which has brought about recognition of new
property rights or rights of substance in the nature of property rights has also brought a recognition of human rights, of
personal and individual rights. Since these rights may De
subjected to interference, to injury, to infringement, justice
demands that the judicial power protect these rights. If the
power or limits of the common law. or statutory provisions, do
not provide the adequate remedies, equity is the proper source
or remedy, just as it was once before in comparable situations. 3
ISee HIGH, INJUNCTIONS (4th ed., Sec. 20b) who appears to
approve of the rule. Other writers seem to accept it without comment or criticism. See BisPHAm, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (10th ed.,
Secs. 37, 465) MERWIN, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1895). However, most
present day writers are critical of the rule. See authorities cited below, n. 3.
'LAwRENCE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1929), Sec. 53, asserts that
equity is not confined to the protection merely of property rights,
but his illustrations to demonstrate tis are mainly instances in which
equity accomplished its purpose by expanding or stretching the concept of what is property
"The rule that equity will not afford relief by injunction except
where property rights are involved is known chiefly by its breach
rather than by its observance; in fact, it may be regarded as a fiction, because courts with greatest uniformity have based their jurisdiction to protect purely personal rights nominally on an alleged
property right, when, in fact, no property rights were invaded."
Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), noted (1924)
19 ILL. LAW REV. 679.
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This has, indeed, been very widely recognized by the courts
and frequently by the legislatures. The result has been the
establishment of some situations, although not in all jurisdictions, in which the power of equity has been made available to
relieve against violation or threatened violation of rights not
connected with property interests. It has also led many courts
to read into a situation some alleged property right which will
justify them in giving relief. There is thus a definite modern
trend to extend equitable relief to protect personal rights, although most courts are not as yet at the point where they unanimously renounce the surface rule that property is prerequisite to equity jurisdiction. 4 Some few courts, however, have
been outspoken in declaring that personal rights recognized by
law will be protected by equity upon the same conditions upon
which property rights will be protected. 5 These conditions, of
course, are that unless relief is granted, a substantial right of
'See Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193; Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries
to Personality (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 640. 668; Long, Equitable
Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights (1923) 33 YALE L. J. 115;
Chafee, Does Equity Follow the Law of Torts? (1926) 75 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 1, Moscovitz, Civil Liberty and In3unctive Protection (1944)
39 ILL. L. REv. 144; annotations, 37 L.R.A. 783 (1921), 14 A.L.R. 295
(1921).
'See illustrative cases throughout succeeding notes.
In Massachusetts, it has been definitely announced that "we
cannot believe that .personal rights recognized by law are in general
less important to the individual or less vital to society or less worthy
of protection by the peculiar remedies equity can afford than are
property rights. We are impressed by the plaintiffs' suggestion that
if equity would safeguard their right to sell bananas it ought to be at
least equally solicitous of their personal liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution. We believe the true rule to be that equity will protect
personal rights by injunction upon the same conditions upon winch
it will protect property rights by injunction." Kenyon v. City of
Chicopee, Mass., 70 N. E. 2d 241 (1946).
In Louisiana, where the civil law, as distinguished from the
Anglo-American common law, prevails, the courts have not been
hampered by the restrictions existing in the Anglo-American law.
Injunction may be granted to protect personal rights. See, e.g.,
Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228, 116 Am. St. Rep.
215 (1906)
In England, the Judicature Act of 1873, Sec. 25, subsec. 8, confers power on the courts to grant injunction in all cases "in which
it shall appear to the court to be just or convenient that such order
should be made." It has been said in Texas that the Texas statutes
confer equivalent power. Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Cr. 413, 50 S.W
933, 76 Am. St. Rep. 724 (1899).
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the plaintiff will be impaired to a material degree, that the
remedy at law is inadequate, and that injunctive relief can be
applied with practical success and without imposing an impossible burden on the court or bringing its processes into disrepute.6
The distinction has been made, no doubt properly, that
where there is no personal right present there is no ground
upon which to base equitable relief. It is, indeed, apparent
that even if equity will protect personal rights, there must be
a personal right existent and judicially cognizable to warrant
the interposition of equity 7 However, an examination of
many of the cases holding that there is no personal right present or no legal injury to be redressed reveals situations as to
which a more enlightened view would consider a personal right
was present 8 Much the same may be said of the often repeated
statements of the courts that equity does not grant protection
of purely moral or ethical rights. 9 Changes of viewpoint might
bring about a consideration that what was once dismissed as a
purely moral or ethical right is instead a personal right of
substance worthy of equity's protection. Moreover, differences
frequently exist between courts of law and courts of equity m
the interpretation of the existence of a personal right which is
judicially cogmzable. The former may deny the existence of a
right for the injury of which an action for damages will lie,
whereas on similar facts the latter may flnd a right deserving
of equitable protection in the absence of any remedy at law.
This dissimilarity of view tends to disappear in a court in
which powers of law and equity have been merged. 1
The existence of an adequate legal remedy may naturally
'Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, preceding note.
'See annotation, Jurisdiction of equity to protect personal
rights, 14 A.L.R. 295. For an interesting analysis of situation, see

Moscovitz, Civil Liberties and In3unctive Protection (1944) 39 ILL.

L. REV. 144.

'For example, the unauthorized use of one's picture or the pub-

lication of matter injurious to one's reputation. The change of view

is set out in the text following under 'Right of Privacy."
'Statement of rule, see Benj. T. Crump Co. v. Lindsay, 130 Va.
144, 107 S.E. 679, 17 A.L.R. 747 (1921).
" Chafee, Does Equity Follow the Law of Torts (1926) 75 U. oF
PA. L. REV. 1.
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result in the refusal to give equitable aid."
Here again,
changes in viewpoint, as well as the effect of the merger of legal
and equitable powers in the same court, may lead to belief that
although there is a legal remedy available it is nevertheless not
so adequate, effective and complete as that which equity can
12
give.
INJURIES TO THE PHYSICAL PERSON

Where physical injury has been inflicted by a completed
act, there isno ground for equitable relief, for in any event
equity does not concern itself with an injury winch is over
and done, with no reasonable probability of repetition. There
is an adequate remedy at law by way of damages for the physical injury inflicted by the completed act. If the act constitutes a crime, as is usually the case, criminal proceedings may
be instituted to pumsh the act. Is the situation different where
physical injury has been inflicted and will, with, reasonable
probability, again be inflicted or, although none has yet been inflicted, there is reasonable probability that it will be'
If property is in question, whether or not a threatened act
is a crime or will give rise to an action for damages, equity will
enjoin its connmssion if the commission of the act will cause
irreparable injury to the property The remedy at law or the
resort to criminal proceedings comes too late and is thus inadequate as a remedy Human life or safety is not less important
than property, at least by present day standards in tins country Hence, if the only remedy available is an action for damages or a criminal proceeding after-the threatened physical injury actually occurs, the remedy is totally inadequate and
equity should intercede. But if there are other methods available for preventing the threatened physical injury, there is no
need to resort to equity For instance, if there is time to apply
to equity before the threatened injury will occur, there is cer
tainly also time in winch to call a policeman or to file a criminal
complaint. This may provide adequate protection and adequate

ISee Snedaker v. King, 111 Ohio 225, 145 N. E. 15 (1924), noted
(1925) 19 ILL. L. REv. 587 (1925), 34 YALE L. J. 327.
2Compare with view of court m Snedaker v. King, supra. that
of the Texas courts, znfra, on discussion of family rights.
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remedy, since the threat of the physical injury may come
within the definition of disorderly conduct or assault or may be
made in connection with a criminal trespass. 3 Adequate relief
may also exist under statutory provisions for placing the
threatener under bond or security to keep the peace.
There may, of course, be situations in which calling a
policeman, filing a criminal complaint or placing one under
bond to keep the peace will not be appropriate methods of
relief. If this is true and no other adequate means of protection are afforded except by equitable remedies, then assuredly
equitable relief should be granted. Illustrations of such situations may be found in the granting of an injunction against
the use of a rifle range until it was made safe to use without
endangering the lives of those occupying adjoining property,'granting injunction against a course of conduct which not only
involved threatened physical injury but which included defamation designed to accomplish the arrest of the complainant and
the loss of her job and other matters of persecution, 15 and the
granting of an injunction against removing an elderly woman to
a pesthouse which was dangerously unsuitable for habitation
by her.16
INJURIES TO PERSONAL REPUTATION

The principle has been announced, with much seeming
firmness, from the earliest cases' 7 to the present day' that
equity will not enjoin the threatened publication of matter
" Randall v Freed, 154 Cal. 299, 97 Pac. 669 (1908).
McKillop v. Taylor, 25 N. J. Eq. 139 (1874).

'1

Although it appears that the personal danger to such occupants
was the reason for granting the injunction, it will be observed that
this type of case would permit an approach based on the element of
a property right if that is considered necessary. That is, it might be
alleged that the use of the rifle range was a nuisance, m that it prevented the plaintiff's reasonable use and enjoyment of his property.
I Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W 233 (Tex. Civ App. 1924), noted
(1924) 19 ILL. L. REV. 679.
"0 Kirk v Wyman, 83 S.C. 372, 65 S.E. 387, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1188 (1909).
Compare Stuart v Board of Supervisors, 83 Ill. 341 (1876),
denying injunction against confinement in unhealthful jail, on
ground
that there was an adequate remedy at law.
17 Brandreth v Lance, 8 Paige (N.Y.) 24, 34 Am. Dec. 368 (1839).
8
' Howell v. Bee Pub. Co., 100 Neb. 39, 158 N.W 358, L.R.A.
1917A 160, Ann. Cas. 1917D 655 (1916).
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defamatory of the personal reputation. An exception has sometimes been stated, to the effect that equity will enjoin. publicat-ion of the defamatory matter as an incident to the specific
enforcement of a trust or contract. 19
This refusal has been based on the ground that equity
protects property rights only (a contention having less validity
today than when originally announced), and on such grounds
as that the constitutional rights of freedom of the press and
right of trial by jury would be interfered with.20 The validity
of such grounds or reasons has been seriously questioned.- 1 it
is undoubtedly true that there have been many departures from
the rule. The recognition in many jurisdictions of the doctrine
of the right of privacy has brought about the equitable restraint
of many acts as invasions of the right of privacy, where actual
consequences of the acts would be to injure personal reputation.2 2 Restraming the wrongful expulsion of one from a club
or social organization is frequently the restraint of an act whicn
would be iijurious to the personal reputation of the expelled
member.2 3 Likewise, restraining the unauthorized publication
of private letters, on the ground that the writer's right of
property in the letters is being protected, may actually be the
prevention of an injury to the personal reputation of the
24
writer.
RIGHT OF PRIVACY

The right of privacy or the right to privacy may be defined as the right of the individual to be let alone, or the right
'"See Choate v Logan, 240 Mass. 131, 133 N.E. 582 (1921) where
it was said that the facts disclosed no contract or trust which was
violated by the defamatory matter.
"See cases in notes immediately preceding.
'Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation (1916) 29 HARV.
L. REV. 665.

Discussion of obligatory correction of errors in books, magazines
and newspapers, on the radio, and in governmental press releases,
in the form of a right of reply or of compulsory retraction, see
Chafee, Possible New Remedies for Errors in the Press (1947) 60
HARV. L. REV. 1.
"2See discussion, znfra,
' See discussion, znfra,
" Publishing letters of
see annotation, 138 A.L.R.
Pritchard.

on Right of Privacy
on Social Rights.
another as invading his right of privacy,
96. See also, infra, n. 29, as to Gee v
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to live one's life in seclusion free from unwarranted and undesired publicity 2- The consequence of such, invasion or publicity may be to hold the individual up to public ridicule or
even scorn or contempt, in short in some way to attack or damage his personal reputation. To a lesser extent it may make
him an object of public curiosity, or otherwise interfere with
2
his peace of mind and his right to the pursuit of happiness. 6
In the past there was no recognition of the existence of
such a right so as to afford a basis of judicial jurisdiction,
whether legal or equitable. Courts of equity refused to enjoin
invasions of privacy on the ground that no property or property right was involved to which irreparable injury was
threatened. Courts of law, short of a clear case of libel, refused to recognize any right which could be the subject of
injury
The change in viewpoint which has now come about is generallv attributed to an article written in 1890 by the late Justice
Brandeis and Professor Warren. They pointed out that it is
a principle as old as the common law that the individual shall
have full protection in person and in property And that it is
necessary from time to time to define anew this protection
where political, social and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights. The time had now come, they argued, to
consider anew the need for increased protection of the person,
rendered necessary by such modern developments as the growth
of photography and the press-to which we may now add radio,
television and even news reels. 27 The weight and validity of
their arguments were very shortly thereafter judicially noticed
and given effect,28 and this has continued to be the case. In
the majority of courts in which the question has arisen, the
courts have recognized that a justifiable right exists and have
' See Melvin v Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297, Pac. 91 (1931)
Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Pnvacy (1890) 4 HARV. L. REv. 193.
Invading right of privacy by publishing another's literary efforts or letters or by using his name, see annotations, 138 A.L.R. 96.
27 Brandeis & Warren, supra, n. 25.
Innumerable articles of
much excellence have appeared in the years since. It may suffice
to cite that of Nizer, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526 (1941), which reviews the
developments since 1890. A very comprehensive collection of cases
on the subject will be found in the annotation, 138 A.L.R. 22.
' Pavesich v New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 6&
(1905).
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afforded protection against invasions or violations of the right.
While many of these courts, plagued by doubt that equity
should protect purely personal rights, have founded their deci20
sion on the existence of some real or technical property right,
others have made the personal right itself the basis of their
decision. 30
Of course, where the right of privacy is recognized as
.justifiable, the relief sought may be by way of damages for
the invasion, 3 1 or by way of munctive relief in equity where
the remedy by way of damages affords inadequate relief. If
the invasion of one's privacy is as yet only threatened, but
threatened with reasonable probability, equitable relief is the
proper remedy to prevent the violation of one's rights from
taking place. Or if the invasion has already taken place but
is of a continuing nature, again equitable relief provides the
proper remedy
The recognition and protection of the right has been
primarily by judicial action, 32 but in several states this recognition and protection has been afforded by statute. 33 However,
"Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W 1076 (1911).
Breach of contract rights, see McCreery v Miller's Groceteria
Co., 99 Colo. 499, 64 P 2d 803 (1936), where it is clear that one of the
defendants, who was nevertheless enjoined, had no contractual relations with the plaintiff.
It is interesting to notice the well known case of Gee v
Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818), wherein the plaintiff sought to enjoin the unauthorized publication of private letters of
his. This, as is well recognized today was in reality an effort to prevent an invasion of the plaintiff's privacy, which would have been
violated by such publication. Lord Eldon, although declaring that
equity protects only rights of property, then found that the writer
of a letter has a property right therein and that such right, however
nominal, is a proper subject of equitable protection. This view as to
a property right in letters has been uniformly followed by the
American courts.
' Reed v Real Detective Publishing Co., Ariz.-- 162 P 2d
133 (1946), noted, (1946) 46 COL. L. REv. 315; (1946) 41 ILL. L. REV.
144.
The California court has based its decision on the state constitutional provision guaranteeing the fundamental right to pursue and
obtain happiness, which it declares includes the right to live one's
life free from unwarranted attacks on one's liberty, property and
reputation. Melvin v. Reid, supra, n. 25.
'As in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F 2d 167 (1942). See
also cases collected in annotation, 138 A.L.R. 22.
- See preceding notes.
'See, e.g., N. Y. Civil Rights Law, Secs. 50, 51, UTAH CODE AiN.
(1943) Tit. 103, c. 4, Secs. 7-9; VA. CODE A N. (1942) Sec. 5782.
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this statutory recognition is usually much narrower in scope
than'that provided by judicial action. 34 This is not to say that
the right as developed by many- courts is by any means broad.
The doctrine of the right of privacy, as developed by judicial
action, has been summarized by one court, 35 as follows. An
incident of the person and not of property ;36 a purely personal
action which does not survive the person injured; 3 7 the right
does not exist where the person has himself published or consented to publication of the matter objected to ;35 the right does
not exist where the person has become so prominent that by
his very prominence he has dedicated his life to the public;30
the right can only be violated by printings, writings, pictures
or- other permanent publications or reproductions and not by
word of mouth;40 and-in some jurisdictions only-that the
'The New York statute, for example, goes no further, than to
protect against the unauthorized use of one's picture for advertising
or commercial uses. The prohibition of the statute has been held not
to apply to a newspaper or to a news film. Jeffries v New York
Evening Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 540, 124 N. Y. S. 780 (1910)
Humston v Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div 467, 178 N. Y. S.
752 (1919)
Melvin v Reid, supra, n. 25.
- Notice that question is entirely oiie of protecting a personal
right.
I Matter v Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P 2d
491 (1939)
But the right of action has been held to survive the death of the
wrongdoer and to be revivable against his administrator. Reed v.
Real Detective Pub. Co., supra, n. 30.
'O'Brien v Pabst Sales Co., 124 F 2d 167 (1942), tort action
for damages.
' This is applied to all those who become what has been described as objects of legitimate public interest, either by voluntarily
following a course of conduct or an occupation of public interest, as
in O'Brien v Pabst Sales Co., in the preceding note, or by involuntarily attracting public interest, as by some anti-social act. as in
Elmhurst v Pearson, 153 F 2d 467 (1946), noted (1946) 46 COL. L.
REV. 1040, where person seeking relief was defendant in sedition
trial of national interest. In this latter regard, reference may also be
made to Melvin v Reid, supra, n. 25, as to incidents of a woman's
life which appeared in the records of her criminal trial and were thus
open to the public as part of the public records. See also Note (1946)
32 VA. L. REV. 1045, as to right of privacy not being enforceable
where public interest involved.
" See criticism of this in paragraph of text following.
Taking and retention of fingerprints and photographs by police
as invasion of right of privacy see State ex rel. Mavity v Tyndall,
-Ind.66 N. E. 2d 755 (1946), noted (J946) 21 TULANE L. REV. 289.
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right of action accrues only when publication or reproduction
41
is made for gain or profit.
Objection may certainly be made to any such requirement
as that the publication must be one for gain or profit. It
should be entirely immaterial what purpose or motive brings
about the invasion of privacy Certainly, so long as it is-knowingly done or continued, it is as much a wrong in one instance as
in the other. The point is not whether the defendant is making
a profit from his invasion of the rights of another, but whether
the right of another is violated. In protecting property rights,
equity does not make relief dependent on whether the defendant profits or not from his wrongful act.
Similarly, it should be entirely immaterial whether the
wrong is accomplished by writings, pictures, or printings on
the one hand or by word of mouth on the other. The point is
not the method by which one violates the rights of an innocent
person, but the fact that he violates the rights to the latter's
injury It is interesting to notice in this regard that the right
of privacy has been held to have been violated by a radio broad42
cast.
Another legitimate object of criticism is the view of many
courts that only one's name and picture are comprised within
one's right of privacy One's privacy must assuredly comprise
more than the mere right to object to the unauthorized use of
one's name or picture, since it is the right to be let alone and to
maintain one's seclusion. On a radio program recently, the
master of ceremonies announced that one of the contestants
would toss away two hundred dollars in dimes-supplied by the
sponsor, of course-in front of the contestant's home on a certain day and hour. As reported on the program the following
week, a large crowd had gathered for hours at the place named,
overflowing into the yards of the neighbors, to their obvious
disturbance, discomfiture and inconvenience. Aside from any
injury to the property of these neighbors and the blocking of
their ingress and egress, it would clearly appear that the radio
program and the broadcasting company were responsible for
the invasion of the neighbors' rights of privacy, and that with' As under the New York statute, supra, n. 34.
'Mau v Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F Supp. 845 (1939)
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out any use of their names or pictures. Indeed, in these days
of commercial advertising, with the policy of using individual's
indorsements of a product, one's name and picture must be
considered to have a definite value and to constitute a property right. The value of this property right naturally varies
and as to most individuals will have only a nominal value.
Nevertheless, as a property right which each of us has, it may
be clearly distinguished from that right of privacy which each
of us has. The right of privacy must, logically, go beyond the
mere use of names and pictures and must relate to all distur43
bance or interference of one's right to be let alone.

DorsTic

OR FAMmy

RIGiTS

AND RELATIONSHIPS

In the matter of domestic or family rights and relationships, courts of equity usually have no trouble in finding present a property right or interest of some sort. The right to
or duty of support, rights of inheritance, right to services, are
common examples. Nevertheless. it is not infrequent to find
courts announcing that the personal rights involved are alone
sufficient to warrant equitable protection, although the weight
of this is usually weakened by the court hurrying on to point
out the property rights that are involved. An example of this
is the well known case of Vanderbilt v Mitchell,44 in which
the plaintiff sought the cancellation of a birth certificate
placed on the public records which charged him with paternity
of the child. He also sought a permanent injunction again.t
the mother and child claiming under this certificate the status,
name or privilege of a lawfully begotten child of his, as well as
an injunction against the appropriate official from issuing
copies of the certificate from the public record. This case is
much cited as an outright example of equity's departure from
the rule that equity protects only property rights.4 5 The court
does say that if the plaintiff's status and personal rights were
alone threatened or invaded by the filing of the false certificate,
' See dissenting opinion in O'Brien v Pabst Sales Co., supra,
n. 38.
' 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 97, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 304 (1907), noted
(1907) 7 COL. L. REV. 533, (1907) 21 HARV. L. REV. 54.
1See
WALSH, TREATISE ON EQUITY (1930)
Sec. 52; annotation
14 A.L.R. 295 (1921)
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nevertheless a court of equity would protect those rights. iHowever, it continues
"But it is not necessary to place the decision upon this ground, because there are sufficient facts presented to enable us to put this case upon the technical basis that
the jurisdiction we are exercising is the protection of property
rights."
These property interests were considered to be the
burden of support that might be imposed upon the plaintiff and
the rights of inheritance that might subsequently be claimed. 40
Another example, wh .rem the property element was supplied by a contract, arose in Kentucky The defendant lived
with her mother in a house jointly owned by them. The plaintiff, another daughter1 obtained an injunction against the defendant molesting and annoying her when she visited their
mother. The court said. "As a general rule, equitable remedies deal with property rights rather than with personal rights
and obligations and at one time the rule was broadly stated
that equity will not interfere to enforce a strictly personal right
where no property right is involved, but that rule has been
greatly relaxed and many cases can be found where a court of
equity has assumed jurisdiction to protect purely personal
rights from invasion
But, even if some property right is
requisite to equity jurisdiction, this element is not wholly lacking in the present case. Appellant and appellee entered into a
written contract in which the former agreed that appellee
should have the right to visit her mother
without molestation by appellant, in consideration of the settlement of certain
IOSimilarly, to annul and cancel an instrument purporting to be
a contract of marriage, on the ground that it was a forgery, see
Sharon v. Hill, 20 Fed. 1 (1880) In overruling a demurrer to the bill,
the court stated that a proper case for equitable relief was stated,
since there was no adequate remedy at law and the contract, after
the death of the complainant who was far older, might be made the
basis of a claim to the large property interests of the complainant.
See also Randazzo v. Rappolo, 105 N.Y.S. 481 (1906) where defendant had gone through a marriage ceremony with a man impersonating the plaintiff; Burns v Stevens, 236 Mich. 443, 210 N. W
482 (1926)
The converse of Vanderbilt v Mitchell, supra, is presented by
Mcrecroft v Taylor, 225 App. Div 562, 234 N.Y.S. 2 (1929) where
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that she was the daughter,
albeit illegitimate, of defendant and that defendant be compelled to
execute and deliver to plaintiff a certificate of plaintiff's birth.
Motion to dismiss the complaint as not stating a cause of action was
denied.
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litigation winch was then pending. The natural right of appellee to visit her mother was fortified by a written contract
executed for a valuable consideration. 1"
Where personal rights of infants are involved, courts of
equity have never hestitated to give relief. Undoubtedly, righis
of property might be adduced to support the equity jurisdiction
and sometimes the courts do adduce such matters. However,
it has been for centuries considered that the welfare of infants
is peculiarly within the purview of the courts' jurisdiction and,
particularly, within the protection of their equity powers. tt
is immaterial whether this is put on the ground that infants
are the wards of the court or on the ground of public policy
A court of equity will exercise its power to determine and protect the personal rights of infants. 4S Much the same is true,
40
incidentally, in regard to the mentally incompetent.
In regard to the marital relation, it has not been infrequent for courts to enjoin interference with the relationship by
a third person, especially where the third person is alienating
the affections of one spouse. This has been especially true of
lower courts, as shown by Dean Pound's collections of newspaper accounts of such occurrences.50 The basis or reason of
the courts' actions in such cases does not appear. In the appellate courts where such injunctive relief has been granted
it has been based on the public policy of protecting and fur
thering the marriage relation or on the ground of the husband's
right in the services and society of the wife or the wife's right
to society of and support from the husband.5i in some jurs47Reed
v Carter, 268 Ky 1, 103 S.W 2d 663 (1937), noted (1937)
51 -ARV. L. REV. 166, (1937) 32 ILL. L. REV. 496, (1938) 22 MIN. L.
REV. 566.
" Ex parte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S.W 936, 14 A.L.R. 286
(1920)
See Moreland, Injunctive Control of Family Relations (1930)
18 Ky. L. J. 207" annotation, Jurisdiction of equity to protect personal
rights, 14 A.L.R. 295, at p. 308.
Injunction to prevent further debauching of plaintiff's minor
daughter, see Stark v Hamilton, 149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861, 5 A.L.R.
1041 (1919).
' See Watson v Watson, 183 Ky
516, 209 S.W 524, 3 A.L.R. 1575
(1919)
Pound, Cases on Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personality (Chafee, 2d ed. 1930) pp. 127-137.
Henley v Rockett, 243 Ala. 472, 8 So. 2d 852 (1942) Ex narte
WVarfield, 40 Tex. Cr. 413, 50 S.W 933, 76 Am. St. Rep. 724 (1899),
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dictions which adhere strictly to the requirement that protection of a property right is essential to equity jurisdiction, relief
in such cases has been denied as involving purely personal
rights and on the grounds that remedies are available at law
and the difficulty of enforcing the injunctive decree. 52
In so far as concerns suits between spouses for equitable
relief, the grant or denial of such relief usually has been dependent upon the existence of property interests or pecuniary
loss. Whether the property interest or probability of pecuniary
loss is real or is more or less invented to justify equitable relief
is another matter. A close approach to ignoring of the property element appears in a New Jersey case wherein the wife
obtained an injunction against her husband continuing the
prosecution of a suit for divorce in another state allegedly
having no jurisdiction. It was remarked that the wife would
either have to go to the "trouble and expense" of appearing
in the other state to fight the suit or allow it to go by default
which would leave her in a position described as a "hardship"
to which the "husband has no right to subject her."
It may
also be noticed that the court was concerned about the rights
and interests of the children of the marriage. 53 However, on
a similar state of facts the New York court denied the wife an
injunction on the ground that no injury was shown except it
injunction obtained by husband; Smith v Womack, (Tex. Civ App.)
271 S.W 209 (1925), writ of error denied by Texas Supreme Court,
injunction obtained by wife, noted (1925) 74 U. of PA. L. REV. 97,
(1925) 10 1VIINN. L. REV. 163; Witte v Bauderer, (Tex. Civ App.
1923) 255 S.W 1016, injunction obtained by husoand, noted (1924)
24 COL. L. REV. 431 (1924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 770, (1924) 72 U. of PA.
L. REV. 451.
The Texas courts also interpret the statutory authorization -co
grant injunction where it shall appear that the party "is entitled to
the relief demanded," or in all cases where he shows himself entitled thereto under principles of equity as giving them a wide
power, equivalent to that of the English courts under the Judicature
Act of 1873. See Ex parte Warfield, supra. Actually this seems to
grant no different powers from those possessed by courts of other
jurisdictions to grant relief "under principles of equity" The difference lies merely in the willingness of the Texas courts to extend
equitable principles to the protection of rights not formerly recognized by equity.
Bank v Bank, 180 Md. 244, 23 A. 2d 700 (1942) Snedaker v
King, 111 Ohio 225, 145 N. E. 15 (1924), noted (1925) 19 ILL. L. REV.
587, (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 327.
" Kempson v Kempson, 58 N. J. Eq. 94, 43 Atl. 97 (1899) -d.,
63 N.J. Eq. 783, 52 Atl. 625 (1902)
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be to her feelings.54 Even where a husband had already
obtained a divorce in another state and returned and married
a second time, the New York court contented itself with rendering a declaratory judgment at the suit of the first wife that she
was still the lawful wife of the defendant husband and denied
her an Injunction against the husband and the other woman
holding themselves out as husband and wife. Injuiction is
warranted, the court held, only where some substantial legal
right is to be protected. It does not intervene to restrain conduct merely injurious to one's feelings and causing mental
anguish. 55
The situation presented by the immediately foregoing
cases would seem to boil down to the question whether the
marital status itself is a substantial legal right which equitv
should protect. Since marital property rights, the rights of
support, and rights and interests of children of the marriage
may also be involved, it would appear that there is ample justification for the intervention of equity
CIvIL RIGHTS
Civil rights are those rights one enjoys as regards other
individuals rather than those in relation to the establishment
and administration of the government, the latter being political
rights. Civil rights are the rights accorded to every member or
citizen of a community or nation with reference to such matters
as property, marriage, family, education and religion, and
designed to assure happiness, equality, freedom from discrimmation, and so on. 56 The term is sometimes used to designate
those rights of the individual guaranteed by the federal constitution and, as well, by the various state constitutions. The
37
term "civil liberties" is also used in this latter connection.
' Goldstein v Goldstein, 283 N. Y. 146, 27 N. E. 2d 969 (1940),
with strong dissent by Conway, J. It does not appear, mncidentally,
that the rights of any children were present.
SBaumann v Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929)
with strcno dissent by O'Brien, J., noted (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 503,
(1929) 29 CoT.. L. Rp, 214. And see Somberg v Somberz, 263 N. Y.
1, 188 N. E. 137 (1933) noted (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV. 1059, (1934)
34 MICH. L. REV. 85 (1934) 82 U. of PA. L. REV. 542.
r MOORE, CYc. LAW DICT. (3d ed.)
"Civil Rights," 10 Am. SuR.
894.
7 See MOORE,
Cyc. LAw DICT. (3d ed.) Moscovitz, Civil Liberties and In3unctive Protection (1944)

39 ILL. LAW REV. 144.
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*When the law gives a civil right, it is recognized that a
violation of the right gives rise to a cause of action for damages, even if not expressly so stated in the law itself. Since
the amount of damage may be only nominal, rendering such
remedy somewhat ineffectual to afford protection and to discourage violations, it is common to provide by statute that
penal or punitive damages in some flat sum shall also be recoverable as well as actual damages. As an alternative means of
protecting civil rights and discouraging their violation, or
sometimes in addition to the right to recover for penal or punitive damages, it is frequently provided that the violation shall
constitute a crime.5 s
In ordinary circumstances, the violation of the right having
already occurred, such remedies may be entirely adequate.
Even if the wrongdoer is determined to continue his course of
conduct, the loss to him in damages from successive actions
against hin may well cause him to stop and consider. Never
theless, occasions have arisen m winch the foregoing remedies
have not been adequate to prevent violations. Repeated violations may require successive actions at law for damages, violations by a great number may require a multiplicity of actions
at law for damages, or an initial violation may be threatened
with reasonable probability M~ust the individual resign himself to an mitial violation or to repeated violations of his civil
rights and content himself thereafter with attempts to obtain
compensation which, may be difficult of ascertainment , Certainly, constitutional or legal guaranties of civil rights mean
little if violation must be submitted to and cannot be prevented.50 In many of the cases asserting that equity does not
protect purely personal or political rights, it has been stated
that equity protects "only civil rights and property rights" or
'See "Civil Rights," 10 AM. JuR. 917" annotation, Constitutionality of "civil rights" legislation by state, 49 A.L.R. 505; annotation,
Private right of action for violation of civil rights statute, 53 A.L.R.
188.
" See Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, -Cal. 2d-, 180 P 2d
321 (1947), placing stress on difficulty of ascertaining compensation
even where statute provides for a flat sum as punitive damages,
since additional punitive damages may be recoverable in excess of
those provided by law upon a proper showing.
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words to that effect.6 0 Since civil rights were not involved in
those cases, the statements amount only to dicta, but they raise
the question whether these courts of equity recognized a field of
operation in between property rights and political rights."i
But despite these dicta, when the question of enjoining violation of a civil right has squarely arisen we find the property
question frequently influencing the court. In a jurisdiction
where the rule is strictly followed that property rights but not
personal rights are protected by equity, injunctive relief to
prevent violation of a civil right has been denied.0 2
In other jurisdictions, however, civil rights have been
considered rights of substance, to be distinguished from personal rights involving trivial issues or for which adequate
remedies at law do actually exist, and preventive relief determined to be the only adequate and suitable relief, as where a
continued policy of violating the civil rights of the complainant
is shown.63 Certainly, if the remedy at law is patently madequate or may not be resorted to successfully, as where the viola04
tion is under color of law, equity is the proper source of relief.
"Chappell v Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 Atl. 542, 37 L.R.A. 783, 51
Am. St. Rep. 476 (1896) Moscovitz, Civil Liberties and In3unctive
Protection (1944) 39 ILL. L. REV. 144 at 149.
"See Moscovitz, supra, preceding note.
'Tate v Eidelman, 32 Oh. N. P., N. S. 478 (1934), noted (1935)
1 OH. ST. U. L. J. 59, wherein the court seemed favorably Inclined to
giving equitable relief but declared it could not do so until the state
Supreme Court overruled its view that equity protects only property
rights.
In White v Pasfield, 212 Ill. App. 73 (1918) wherein negroes
were excluded from a public swimming pool in violation of a civil
rithts statute, injunctive relief was denied on the ground that equity
does not protect personal rights. It was indicated, however, that an
adequate remedy by way of mandamus against the public officials
was available.
See Orloff v Lcs Angeles Turf Club, supra, note 59.
" Kenyon v City of Chicopee, -Mass.70 N. E. 2d 241 (1946),
enjoining interference with distribution of handbills by religious
sect; Harjst v Hoeger, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W 2d 609 (1942), enjoining use of school funds for sectarian religious purposes; Garrett
v Rose, 161 S.W 2d 893 (Tex. Civ App. 1942) enjoining interference with religious practices.
Interference, under color of law, with civil rights guaranteed by
the federal constitution is ground for suit in equity in the federal
courts, according to the federal statutes. U. S. Code, Tit. 28, Sec. 41
(14) See also CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE (2d ed.) Sec. 252;
Moscovitz, supra, n. 60.
Mandamus has also been resorted to in order to compel public
officials to discontinue racial discrimination or the like. Stone v.
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Judicial language on the point has tended- to become more and
more emphatic in favor of equitable relief.6 5 It is submitted that
in a case where it can be shown with-reasonable probability that
an initial violation will occur equity should interpose to protect
the civil right, rather than letting the violation occur and directing the injured person to seek relief by way of damages.
SOCIAL

RIGHTs

Social rights, for our purposes, may be defined briefly as
those rights arising from compamonship or relationship with
others, m clubs, social or fraternal organizations, and the like.
Where the right asserted is merely the right to be allowed
to continue this association or companionship, as wbere expulsion is threatened or has taken place, no property right really
exists to warrant equitable protection in a jurisdiction wherein
property is an essential prerequisite to equity jurisdiction. 66
Even in a more liberal jurisdiction, equitable relief might well
be denied on the basis that there is no injury which warrants
judicial remedy of any kind and that, in any event, it would
not lie within the power of a court of equity to compel men to
associate with each other when they are disinclined or unwilling
to do so. 67 Moreover, as is well known, courts are uniformly
Board of Directors, 47 Cal. App. 2d 749, 118 P 2d 866 (1941), mandamus issued to compel city officials to admit negroes to public
swimming pool; Pearson v Murray 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590, 103
A.L.R. 706 (1936), mandamus as proper remedy where state refused to admit negro law students to state maintained law school.
'See particularly, Kenyon v City of Chicopee, preceding note.
'See Baird v Wells, L.R. 44 Ch. Div 661 (1890)
See Chafee. Internal Affairs of Associations not for Profit
(1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 993; Note, (1917) 1 MiNN. L. REV. 513; Note,
(1927) 37 YALE L. J. 368.
The late Professor Walsh, in his Treatise on Equity (1930) p.
275, note 37, asks if equity would intervene in the case of wrongful
expulsion from a petty card club having only a handful of members who have contributed a small sum for prizes, and argues that
a remedy by way of damages should be adequate and that any injury to personality would be too petty to warrant injunctive relief.
Certainly one may agree with this, for it is but a reminder of the
principle that equity does not concern itself with trivial matters.
Some of the English cases denying relief may well be put upon this
ground.
Admission to membership cannot be compelled, see Chapman v.
American Legion, 244 Ala. 553, 14 So. 2d 225, 147 A.L.R. 585 (1943).
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unwilling to interfere in the internal affairs of clubs and asso8
ciations.6
Nevertheless, there is one aspect of this situation which has
a strong appeal for a court of equity The expulsion of one
from a club, social organization or the like, implies that he
cannot get along with lus fellows, or even worse that he is
unfit to be associated with. Once the news of his expulsion is
bruited about, the consequences in his personal and m his
business life can be very harmful. If the expulsion is wrongful,
the situation is highly inequitable as to him. Thus, when an expulsion is wrongfully thrLeatened or attempted, an expulsion
which may blacken the victim's character, destroy his peace of
mind, injure him in his private and Ins business life, an injury
or wrong is threatened to him for which all fair minded men
will agree there should be a judicial remedy somewhere. Equity
is the logical place to obtain this remedy or relief and equity has
risen to the challenge. 69
Many courts interpose in the situation of an expulsion without a hearing or without a fair hearing, on the ground that such
conduct is contrary to "natural justice" or "fair play "70 The
difficulty concerning the existence of a property right has frequently been surmounted by determining that the constitution
or by-laws of the club or organization providing for membership or the agreement by which one becomes a member constitute a contract between the member and the club or organization. An attempt wrongfully to expel the member is said to
be a breach of his contract and thus an injury to a property
right, since the contract or the rights under it constitute a
property right. Upon this basis, many courts of equity have
been willing to examine the rightfulness or wrongfulness of a
threatened expulsion or of an accomplished expulsion and to
enjoin threatened or pending expulsion proceedings if found
"See Note (1922)

'See

7 CORN. L.

Q.

261.

Chafee, Internal Affairs of Associations not for Profit,

(1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 993.
,"See Note (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOUR. 202; Pound, Equitable

Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29
HARV. L. REv. 640.

Expulsion because of exercise of constitutional rights as citizen,

see Spayd v Ringing Rock Lodge, etc., 270 Pa. St. 67, 113 Atl. 70, 14
A.L.R. 1443 (1921), noted (1922) 35 HARV. L. REv. 332, (1922) 6
MINN. L. REV. 241.
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to be wrongful or to enforce performance of the contract by
compelling reinstatement of a member if the wrongful expulsion has been accomplished. Any remedy at law by way of
damages is a totally inadequate remedy in the circumstances. 7 1
In some cases, some other technical property interest has been
found, as for instance some interest in assets or property of the
72

organization.

Where, as is frequently the case these days, membership
in an organization or society carries with it concrete benefits,
such as health, accident, hospital, .medical or life insurance, or
the like, the loss of such benefits from a wrongful expulsion
definitely deprives the member of property rights. This is a
deprivation or loss against which equity will give relief, since
the remedy at law is inadequate.7 3 As to membership in labor
unions, trade associations and the like, the matter goes beyond
mere social relationships and enters the realm of the power to
earn a living or the right to carry on a lawful business and
74
has been discussed in a previous article.
When any remedy exists within the club, association or
organization, the member must first exhaust it before applviug
to the courts, unless the procedure whereby this remedy is obtained is too burdensome or is unfairly conducted75
I See Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763, 49 L.R.A. 400
(1897) See also Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and
In3urzes to Personality (1916) 29 HARV. L. REV. 640, at p. 680;
WALSH, TREATISE ON EQUITY (1930), pp. 275-277 and notes thereto.
-Weiss v Musical Mut. Protective Union, 189 Pa. St. 446, 42 Ati.
118 (1899). See Pound, supra, n. 71, at p. 677- Chafee, Internal Affairs of Associations not for Profit (1930), 43 HARV. L. REV. 993.
That a substantial property right must be involved, see Howard
v Betts, 190 Ga. 530, 9 S. E. 2d 742 (1940)
The dispute within a society or association may, of course, concern other matters than expulsion of a member. If the dispute between the society or association and the member involves property
rights, a court of equity will take cognizance of it. See Ryanlov
Cudahy, 157 Ill. 108, 41 N. E. 760, 49 L.R.A. 353, 48 Am. St. Rep. 305
(1895).
' Ayres v. Order of United Workmen, 188 N. Y. 280, 80 N. E.
1020 (1907)
"See de Fumak, Equitable Protection of Bus-ness and Business
Rights (1947) 35 Ky. Law Jour. 261.
' Fales v Musicians Protective Union, 40 R. I. 34, 99 Atl. 823
(1917).
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RianmS*

Political rights are the rights of participation in the establishment and adminitration of the government and include
such rights as the right to vote, the right to be a candidate for
public office, the right to hold public office, the right to see to
the proper- disposition of public funds, and similar matters.
They are to be distinguished from civil rights."
In the past, courts in the exercise of equity jurisdiction
have refused to grant injunctive relief against the violation or
denial of political rights. This has variously been put upon the
ground that no property rights or interests in property are
involved,7 7 that there are other adequate remedies available7s
or that the matter is properly within the jurisdiction of other
branches of the government and that equity cannot interfere or
should not interfere as a matter of public policy 79
So far as the use of the so-called extraordinary remedies,
particularly mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto, are
available, as to enforce one's right to register or to vote or to
try title to public office, it may be conceded that there are adequate remedies which render unnecessary a resort to equity It
may also be conceded that matters sometimes arise wluch are
properly within the jurisdiction or cognizance of some other
branch of the government, such as the legislative branch, and
are not within the jurisdiction or cognizance of equity or for
that matter of the judicial branch at all.80 It may well be
doubted, however, in view of modern developments, that the
property element is any longer a requisite for the protection of
personal or individual rights, certainly where such rights are
recognized as legal rights, as political rights are. If there is
no other adequate remedy, as by way of mandamus or quo
warranto, for example, to prevent the loss of or injury to a
political right and there is no question of invading the province
"MOORE, Cyc. LAW DICT., (3d ed.) Moscovitz, Civil Liberty and
In3unctive Protection (1944) 39 ILL. L. REV. 144.
Fletcher v Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220,
25 L.R.A. 143 (1894)
Fletcher v Tuttle, supra, n. 77.
Walls v Brundidge, 109 Ark. 250, 160 S.W 230 (1913) Duggan v Emporia, 84 Kan. 429, 114 P 235, Ann. Cas. 1912A 719 (1911)
See Spies v Byers, 267 Ill. 627, 122 N.E. 841 (1919)

EQUITY--PERsONAIY RIGHTS

of another branch of the government, equitable relief should
be awarded.81
It will be found that equitable relief is being increasingly
given, at least as part of the relief, where political rights are
in disputes 2 This is patieularly true in code states where law
and equity powers are merged in one court. Thus, despite
some authority to the contrary, where title to a public office
is in dispute, an injunction will usually issue to protect the
possession of the incumbent while the title is determined in a
court of law or on the law side of the court.5 3 Sometimes the
political question may give rise to tax liability and on the
ground that a property question is involved as the main issue
of the case, the equity-couart has passed on the political question as being merely incidental to the main issue of the property right ivolveds 4 The property interest of the taxpayer
has also frequently provided the basis for enjoining the holdmg of an invalid election relating- to the expenditure of public
funds.8 But whether placed on the ground of protection of a
legal right or on the ground of protecting a property right, the
increasing tendency, as already remarked, is to extend equitable
relief to political rights as in the cases of other personal rights.
" See Gilmore v Waples, 108 Tex. 167, 188 S.W 1037 (1916).
'Illustrations of equitable protection of political rights and
some of the judicial reasoning to justify it, are given by Moscovitz,
Civil Liberties and Injunctive Protection (1944), 39 ILL. L. REV. 144 at

154, 155.
'Heyward v Long, 178 S.C. 351, 183 S.E. 145, 114 A.L.R. 1330
(1935) and annotation thereto at 1147.
s'Coleman v. Board of Education, 131 Ga. 643, 63 S.E. 41 (1908).
'It
is frequently asserted that the rule is that injunction will
not issue to enjoin the holding of an election but such rule is open
to serious question in view of the many decisions allowing injunction. The matter seems to boil down to the question of whether or
not there is any other adequate remedy except in equity to protect
the political right of the plaintiff or to the question whether the
matter is one placed by governing law beyond the jurisdiction of the
judiciary generally. See annotation, Power to enjoin holding of
election, 33 A.L.R. 1376; Note, (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 138; Note,
(1933) 18 CORN. L. Q. 278; Note, (1921) Wis. L. REV. 309; MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQunTy (1936), Sec. 161.

